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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BOGOTA 6992

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, CO
SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES: SECURITY ASSISTANCE
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 168320

SUMMARY: PARAGRAPHS BELOW ARE SUBMITTED FOR USE IN PREPARATION
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION DOCUMENT TO SUPPORT THE
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BUDGETING REQUEST. RESPONSES ARE
KEYED TO PARAGRAPHS IN REFTEL (A) AS INDICATED.

I. PARA 3A (1) US INTERESTS AND THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM RELATIONSHIP.

A. US INTERESTS: COLOMBIA AND ITS ARMED FORCES (CAF) HAVE
MAINTAINED A POSTURE OF HIGH REGARD FOR MILITARY SUBORDIN-
ATION TO CIVILIAN CONTROL AND FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN ONE OF THE
FEW REMAINING DEMOCRATIC NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. THE GOC
AND THE CAF HAVE PRESERVED AND NURTURED THIS FUNCTIONING
DEMOCRACY DESPITE FREQUENT PERIODS OF DOMESTIC TURMOIL.
SINCE THE CAF IS A LARGE, INFLUENTIAL AND RESPECTED SEG-
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MENT OF SOCIETY, THE PRESERVATION OF THIS DEMOCRACY HAS
BEEN ABETTED TO A GREAT DEGREE BY U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE,
WHICH ALSO HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE USG'S INFLUENCE UPON
COLOMBIA'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. COLOMBIA
OCCUPIES A STRATEGIC LOCATION IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE
PANAMA CANAL SINCE ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION PROVIDES ACCESS
TO BOTH ENTRANCES OF THE WATERWAY; THEREFORE, ITS COOPER-

ATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THESE APPROACHES IS VITAL TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS. COLOMBIA, A MODERATE, RESPECTED THIRD WORLD NATION, HAS THE ABILITY TO EXERT A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE IN HEMISPHERIC AND WORLD AFFAIRS BY TAKING POSITIONS FAVORABLE, OR AT LEAST NOT ADVERSE, TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FORA. UNFORTUNATELY, COLOMBIA IS A MAJOR SOURCE AND TRANSIT POINT FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS AND OTHER CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES. SINCE THE PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR THESE ACTIVITIES IS THE U.S., CONTINUED FAVORABLE RELATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY TO GAIN MAXIMUM COOPERATION FROM GCO AGENCIES IN OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT ILLEGAL IMPORTATIONS INTO THE U.S. FINALLY, COLOMBIA IS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF IMPORTANT RAW MATERIALS SUCH AS NATURAL GAS, NICKEL, COAL, AND URANIUM, AND OF FOOD PRODUCTS SUCH AS COFFEE AND SUGAR.

B. SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES: THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO U.S. INTERESTS. THEY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE ESSENTIAL COLOMBIAN INTERNAL SECURITY GOALS WITHOUT SOPHISTICATED OR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND TO EXPRESS THE USG WILLINGNESS TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST NATIONS WHICH ESPOUSE DEMOCRATIC VALUES, INCLUDING A RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THESE OBJECTIVES ARE: (1) ASSIST IN THE MODERNIZATION OF THE CAF TO IMPROVE AND STRENGHTEN THEIR CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN A REASONABLE LEVEL OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY. (2) INCREASE THE CONTRI-
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BUTION THAT THE MILITARY CAN MAKE TOWARD CONTROLLING ILLICIT NARCOTICS AND CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES. (3) ASSIST IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR CAPABILITY TO PERFORM "NATION BUILDING" CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS. (4) MAINTAIN FAVORABLE DISPOSITION OF THE CAF TWARD THE U.S. (5) COUNTER ATTEMPTS BY THE USSR AND/OR OTHER COMMUNIST-ORIENTED COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH INFLUENCE INTHE HEMISPHERE. (6) MAINTAIN RELIANCE ON THE U.S. AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLY FOR MILITARY EQUIPEMENT AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING. (7) CONTINUE THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL INFLUENCE WITHIN THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY. (8) MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH AN INFLUENTIAL SEGMENT OF COLOMBIAN SOCIETY WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOC'S WILLINGNESS TO SERVE AS A MODERATE THIRD WORLD NATION SUSCEPTIBLE TO U.S. REASONING AND CAPABLE OF ASSITING THE U.S. IN PROMOTING ITS POLICIES WITH OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN LATIN AMERICA. (9) CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGHTENING OF A GOC INSTITUTION DEDICATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ORDER NECESSARY TO CONTINUATION OF A DEMOCARATIC GOVERNMENT.

II. PARA 3A (2) THREATS.

A. EXTERNAL: THE MAJOR EXTERNAL THREAT FROM THE VIEWPOINT

OF COLOMBIA IS FROM VENEZUELA. THIS IS ATTRIBUTED TO A LONG-STANDING BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND VENEZUELA'S RECENT LARGE ORDER FOR GUIDED-MISSILE DESTROYER ESCORTS AND OTHER WAR MATERIAL. INCREASED ARMS PURCHASES BY ECUADOR HAVE CAUSED COLOMBIA TO LOOK TOWARD ITS SOUTHERN BORDER ALSO. THIS CONCERN HAS BEEN TRANSLATED INTO EFFORTS BY THE CAF TO ACHIEVE MINIMAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO DEFEND AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUILDUP. AT THIS TIME, COLOMBIA IS LESS CONCERNED WITH THE MASSIVE ARMS BUILDUP OF PERU BECAUSE OF THAT COUNTRY'S PREOCCUPATION WITH ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS.

B. INTERNAL: THE INTERNAL THREAT CONSISTS OF FACTIONALIZED INSURGENCY AS WELL AS ORGANIZED CRIME. THIS WILL LIKELY

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CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE WITH SPORADIC GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN ISOLATED REGIONS, SOME URBAN TERRORISM, AND CONSIDERABLE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. THE POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED INSURGENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT POSE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT.

C. STRATEGY TO MEET THE THREATS: THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT STRATEGY TO MEET BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS IS TO MODERNIZE THE MILITARY FORCES TO ACHIEVE THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO COUNTER ANY POTENTIAL THREAT FROM

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ITS NEIGHBORS' OFFENSIVE ARMS BUILDUPS. THIS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND THE ILLEGAL NARCOTIC AND OTHER CONTRABAND TRAFFIC THAT TRANSITS THE COUNTRY. MODERNIZATION EFFORTS INCLUDE THE PROCUREMENT OF T-33 AND T/A-37 AIRCRAFT FOR THE AIR FORCE; NEGOTIATIONS FOR PROCUREMENT OF PORTUGUESE CORVETTES BY THE NAVY; AND ARMY DESIRES TO MODERNIZE THEIR ANTI-TANK DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY THROUGH THE REACTIVATION AND EQUIPPING WITH ANTI-TANK WEAPONS OF A PREVIOUSLY DEACTIVATED ARMORED BATTALION. THEY HAVE PURCHASED U.S. TACTICAL GROUND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL GREATLY INCREASE THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY WHICH HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT IN THE PAST. ALL OF THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT, EITHER PURCHASED OR IN THE PLANNING STAGE, WOULD BE USED FOR COASTAL OR BORDER PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE, WITH A DUAL MISSION OF ASSISTING OTHER AGENCIES IN COMBATING THE ILLEGAL NARCOTIC AND CONTRABAND TRADE AND ASSISTING THE ARMY IN THEIR ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS.

III. PARA 3A (3) MISSION PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT.
THE MISSION DOES NOT PLACE THE SAME EMPHASIS ON THE EXTERNAL THREAT AS DOES THE HOST COUNTRY, BUT THE MISSION PERCEPTION
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OF THE INTERNAL THREAT IS THE SAME AS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE THREAT FROM ORGANIZED CRIME IS ON THE INCREASE AND COULD BE MORE DISRUPTIVE TO THE GOC IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE OF THE LARGE SUMS OF MONEY RECEIVED FROM ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, AND THE RESULTING DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON COLOMBIAN SOCIETY.

IV. PARA 3A (4) TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BELIEVED BEST SUITED BY HOST COUNTRY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE THREAT: THE HOST COUNTRY BELIEVES THAT THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT (ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINES AND JOINT STAFF) WITH EMPHASIS ON SHORT RANGE TACTICAL, GROUND, SEA AND AIR WEAPONS IS BEST SUITED TO COUNTER BOTH THEIR EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS. ADDITIONALLY, THEY BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE BEST TYPE ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT TO PERMIT THE CAF TO ASSIST OTHER AGENCIES IN COMBATING THE ILLEGAL DRUG AND CONTRABAND PROBLEM.

V. PARA 3A (5) MISSION ASSESSMENT OF THE ABOVE FORCE.
THE MISSION CONCURS WITH THE HOST COUNTRY ESTABLISHMENT AND TYPE OF FORCES NECESSARY TO MEET THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREAT AS THEY SEE IT. TO FURTHER U.S. INTERESTS IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE APPROACHES TO THE PANAMA CANAL AND TO COUNTER ILLICIT DRUG AND CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES, MORE

EMPHASIS COULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPING A BETTER COAST GUARD-TYPE CAPABILITY IN THE COLOMBIAN NAVY.

VI. PARA 3A (6) DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF GNP.

A. 1978 DEFENSE EXPENDITURE: PERCENT TOTAL BUDGET PERCENT GNP

OPERATIONAL 163 MIL	5.3	1.6
FMS 26 MIL	.8	.3
TOTAL 189 MIL	6.1	1.9

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B. MILITARY IMPORTS ESTIMATED PERCENT TOTAL IMPORTS

OPERATIONAL 30MIL	.6
FMS 26 MIL	.6
TOTAL 56 MIL	1.2

C. FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS: COLOMBIA'S LOW DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE NOT ANTICIPATED TO PRESENT ANY FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT-SERVICING PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF THIS MODEST ARMED FORCES MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

VII. PARA 3A (7) PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES: NOT REQUIRED.

VIII. PARA 3A (8) ASSESSMENT OF ITEM PROJECTION IN FY 80-84
MSAP: NOT REQUIRED.

IX. PARA 3A (9) ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PROCUREMENT OF ARTICLES OUTLINE IN THE FY 80-84
MSAP IS MINIMAL SINCE MOST OF THE MORE EXPENSIVE PROCUREMENTS WILL HAVE BEEN MADE; I.E., AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS. IN VIEW OF THE SMALL OPERATIONAL BUDGET PROGRAMMED FOR THE MILITARY FORCES, CONTINUED FMS FINANCING IS INDICATED AFTER COMPLETION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM COSTS IN FY 79.

B. IMPACT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND EFFECT ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES: THE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND EFFECT ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES WILL BE FROM NONE TO MINIMAL DUE TO THE SMALL OPERATIONAL BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THE ARMED FORCES.

C. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED FMS FINANCING: THERE HAVE BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE ADVANCED OR UNNECESSARY, COSTLY EQUIPMENT OR PROGRAMS FOR THE CURRENT PLANS TO DEVELOP A MODEST AND MODERNIZED DEFENSIVE FORCE DESIGNED TO INSURE NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL ORDER. IN VIEW OF THE SMALL OPERATIONAL BUDGET PROGRAMMED FOR THE CAF,
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CONTINUED FMS FINANCING IS CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM COSTS INCURRED THRU FY 79.

X. PARA 3A (10) ARMS CONTRL LEGISLATION: CURRENT ARMS CONTROL LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT IMPACT HEAVILY ON ANY MAJOR SALE OF WEAPONS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE. THE EFFECT ON THE ANDEAN REGION SHOULD BE THAT OF GREATER STABILITY WHILE NOT INCITING AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES AS NO NEW CAPABILITY WILL BE INTRODUCED TO THE REGION.

XI. PARA 3A (11) HUMAN RIGHTS: COLOMBIAN SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD ARE OUTSTANDING. THE MODEST SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AS VISUALIZED BY THE MISSION AND THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE CAF, DOES NOT VIOLATE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. A DENIAL OF THE ITEMS REQUESTED BY COLOMBIA AS PRESENTLY RECEIVED, WOULD SEEM TO ASSIGN TO IT THE SAME TREATMENT GIVEN TO NATIONS WHICH CONSISTENTLY DISREGARD HUMAN RIGHTS.

XII. PARA 3A (12) ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES: OVERTURES FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MADE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR TO PROMOTE MILITARY SALES. HOWEVER, TO DATE, ONLY FRANCE CONTINUES TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE IN

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THE FORM OF SUPPORT THE THE SQUADRON OF MIRAGES PUR-

CHASED IN THE EARLY 1970'S. NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE ON THE PURCHASE OF PORTUGUESE CORVETTES FOR THE COLOMBIAN NAVY. THE SOVIET UNION HAS PROVIDED SOME EQUIPMENT ON FAVORABLE TERMS IN THE PAST, BUT WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY RECENT SOVIET OFFERS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

XIII. PARA 3A (13) COUNTRY PROGRAM LEVELS.

A. LEVEL 1.

(1) FMS MINIMUM LEVEL 6.7 MIL.

(A) DESCRIPTION: THE LEVEL WILL ALLOW MINIMUM PURCHASE OF VEHICLES REQUIRED FOR NECESSARY MOBILITY OF TACTICAL BRIGADES AND SOME REPLACEMENT OF SMALL ARMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL, WHILE ASSURING A MINIMUM OF TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITY, WOULD NOT PROVIDE ASSETS NECESSARY TO ADEQUATELY COMBAT RURAL GUERRILLA AND BANDIT OPERATIONS, TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR GOC'S FRONTIERS, NOR ASSETS FOR COASTAL PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE.

(C) MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPROVING MINIMUM LEVEL: GUERRILLA FORCES COULD MAKE MORE SUBSTANTIAL GAINS

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IN THE RURAL AREAS OF COLOMBIA IF THE ARMY WERE NOT MOBILE. IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A CAPABILITY FOR COASTAL PATROL SURVEILLANCE, THEREBY NEGATING ANY POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED COOPERATION IN COMBATING THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS AND CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES, AND OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

(2) IMET MINIMUM LEVEL .250 MIL.

(A) DESCRIPTION: THIS FUNDING LEVEL WILL PERMIT EACH OF THE CAF TO OBTAIN ONLY THEIR TOP PRIORITY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME) NEEDS. CAREFULLY SELECTED OFFICERS WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND AF/ARMY/NAVY/MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGES (CGSC), WHILE SEVERAL ARMY O-5'S SELECTED FOR PROMOTION WILL ATTEND DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT COURSES. ONE OR TWO OFFICERS WOULD ATTEND ENGINEER/INF/FIELD ARTILLERY ADVANCED COURSES. THE COLOMBIAN AIR FORCE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE ITS POLICY OF SENDING A HIGHLY QUALIFIED OFFICER TO SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL AND ACADEMIC INSTRUCTOR COURSES. ONE NAVAL OFFICER EACH WOULD ATTEND THE UNDERSEA MEDICAL AND FOREIGN OFFICER NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COURSES AND ONE MARINE CORPS OFFICER WOULD ATTEND THE MARCORPS CGSC.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO BARELY MAINTAIN U.S. INFLUENCE AND EXPOSURE TO OUR TRADITIONS AND IDEALS FOR SELECT COLOMBIAN OFFICERS OF ALL SERVICES. IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TRAINED OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY AT THE JUNIOR LEVEL, TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THE CAF'S MODEST MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

(C) MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPROVING MINIMUM LEVEL:
COLOMBIA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FIND SUFFICIENT SUPPLIERS
FOR ITS CRITICAL MILITARY TRAINING NEEDS AMONG THE COUNTRIES
OF LATIN AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE DUE TO ECONOMIC CON-
SIDERATIONS. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY WOULD
DIMINISH. HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD PROBABLY BE UNAFFECTED.

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B. LEVEL 2.

(1) FMS INTERMEDIATE LEVEL 12.2.

(A) DESCRIPTION: THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT THE PURCHASE OF
TRANSPORTATION ASSETS, SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AIRCRAFT, SOME
SMALL ARMS, AND COMMAND CONTROL EQUIPMENT.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL NOT
FULFILL REQUIREMENTS FOR MINIMUM INTERNAL DEFENSE. ALTHOUGH
THIS LEVEL WILL PROVIDE A CAPABILITY HIGHER THAN LEVEL 1, IT
IS BELOW THE ACCEPTABLE LEVELS FOR MINIMUM INTERNAL
DEFENSE. IT PROVIDES NO CAPABILITY FOR COASTAL PATROL SUR-
VEILLANCE, THEREBY NEGATING FUTURE INCREASED COOPERATION IN
COMBATING THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS AND CONTRABAND TRADE, AND IN
DEFENDING THE PANAMA CANAL.

HUMAN RIGHTS WILL PROBABLY BE UNAFFECTED.

(2) IMET N/A.

(3) MAP N/A.

C. LEVEL 3.

(1) FMS CURRENT LEVEL 23.3 MIL.

(A) DESCRIPTION: THIS LEVEL WILL PROVIDE FOR A GREATER
DETERRENCE TO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL THREATS BY INSURING MINIMUM
ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCES.

(B) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT: BY ALLOWING FOR THE PUR-
CHASE OF ADEQUATE VEHICLES TO INSURE SUFFICIENT MOBILITY,
ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, AIRCRAFT, SMALL COASTAL PATROL
BOATS AND SUPPORT, THE CAF WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO WITH-
STAND THE THREAT FROM INTERNAL GUERRILLA FORCES AND A
MINIMUM THREAT FOR EXTERNAL FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, THEY
WOULD BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING COASTAL PATROL AND SURVEILLANCE
ACTIVITIES TO ASSIST IN COUNTERING THE ILLICIT DRUG AND
CONTRABAND TRADE. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A MINIMUM CAPA-
BILITY TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

(2) IMET CURRENT LEVEL .450 MIL.

(A) DESCRIPTION: THIS FUNDING WILL APPROXIMATELY
MAINTAIN COLOMBIA'S LEVEL OF CONUS TRAINING SPACES AND
MTTS AS IN PREVIOUS FY'S. COUPLED WITH CADET AND ENLISTED
TRAINING IN THE CANAL ZONE MILITARY SCHOOLS, IT WILL MAIN-
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TAIN U.S. INFLUENCE AND THE EXCELLENT
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS AND COOPERATION ALREADY
ESTABLISHED. IT WILL MATERIALLY ASSIST THE MODERNIZATION
PROGRAMS, PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, BY PROVIDING TRAINING FOR
FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICER, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER, USMC
BASIC OFFICER, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING POST-GRADUATE LOGISTICS,
COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVAL ENGINEERING SPECIALISTS.

(B) RISK ASSESSMENT: WITHOUT THE ADDITIONAL TRAINING
PROVIDED BY THIS LEVEL, THE PROGRESSIVE BUT FINANCIALLY
STRAPPED CAF'S MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS WILL LOSE IMPETUS.

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HUMAN RIGHTS WILL PROBABLY BE UNAFFECTED.
(3). MAP: N/A

XIV. PARA 3 (13)F SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION MANNING
LEVELS.

A. ALLLEVELS.

U.S. OFFICERS 6
U.S. CIVILIANS 2
LWR 12
TOTAL 20

B. JUSTIFICATION: UNDER EXISTING U.S. STATUTES AND
AGREEMENTS, SIX MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE THE MINIMUM REQUIRED
TO PROVIDE THE EXPERTISE NECESSARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE
MANAGEMENT FROM A NATIONAL POLICY LEVEL THROUGH THE IMPLI-
MENTATION BY THE RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE
ATTENDANT PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE
PROCESS FROM ACQUISITION THROUGH FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT TO CASE

CLOSEOUT. THE SIX OFFICERS ARE ALSO REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE NEEDED INTERACTION WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE U.S. SERVICE IN ALL ASPECTS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE. ADDITIONALLY, THEY PROVIDE THE REQUIRED CLOSE LIAISON NECESSARY TO FOSTER THE NEEDED FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CAF. THE CHIEF OF THE ORGAN-
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IZATION, A ROTATIONAL BILLET BETWEEN THE THREE SERVICES, REPRESENTS THE SECDEF, THROUGH USSOUTHCOM AS THE SENIOR DOD OFFICIAL ON MILITARY MATTERS (LESS ATTACHE AFFAIRS). EACH MISSION SERVES AS MILITARY CONSULTANT TO THE CAF AT THE MOD/ SERVICE COMMAND LEVEL AND DIRECTS THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICE UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR. THE CIVILIAN AND LWR ARE REQUIRED TO PERFORM THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT DUTIES INHERENT TO THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

XV. PARA 3 (13)H SPECIFIC TYPES OF TRAINING AND NUMBER OF STUDENTS - CONUS AND CANAL ZONE.

A. TYPE TRAINING: STUDENT NUMBERS:

1. ARMY

 A. CONUS

 (1) PME 15

 B. CANAL ZONE

 (1) PME 234

2. NAVY

 A. CONUS

 (1) PME 8

 (2) SPECIALIST 1

 (3) TECHNICIAN 3

3. AIR FORCE

 A. CONUS

 (1) PME 2

 (2) TECHNICAL 9

 B. CANAL ZONE

 (1) TECHNICAL 120

B. JUSTIFICATION: COLOMBIA'S SMALL DEFENSIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAIMS ONLY A MODEST PORTION OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET. COLOMBIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS OVERWHELMINGLY
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U.S. ORIENTED. THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY OFFICERS SHOW A CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR U.S. TRAINING. HOWEVER, THEIR LIMITED MILITARY BUDGET DOES NOT PERMIT THEM TO PURCHASE THE REQUIRED TRAINING UNDER FMS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY

DO NOT HAVE COURSES OF SUFFICIENT SOPHISTICATION TO PROVIDE THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION, SPECIALTY, TRAINING NOR TECHNICAL TRAINING AT THE LEVELS REQUIRED. IN GENERAL, THE SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE ON A PAR WITH COLOMBIA'S; AGAIN NOT PROVIDING THE REQUIRED LEVEL OF TRAINING. THEY HAVE NOT TURNED TO THE EUROPEAN TRAINING MARKET BECAUSE, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE MAJORITY OF THEIR EQUIPMENT IS OF U.S. ORIGIN AND THEIR STRONG DESIRE IS FOR U.S. TRAINING. THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, TACTICS, AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS ARE ORIENTED TOWARD THE U.S. ALL GENERAL FLAG OFFICERS HAVE ATTENDED PME IN THE U.S.

XVI. PARA 3 (13)I CHARGE'S ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR FY 80, 81 AND 82: THE TOTAL ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 80, 81, AND 82 ARE:

A. FY 80.

(1) FMSCR \$23.3 MIL.

THESE FUNDS WOULD BE EXPENDED FOR THE PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORT, SHIPS, GROUND TRANSPORTATION, SMALL ARMS, AND GROUND AND NAVAL SUPPORT ITEMS.

(2) IMET \$.450 MIL.

THESE FUNDS WOULD BE EXPENDED AS A CONTINUATION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM AS REFERRED TO IN PARA XIII C (2)(A) ABOVE.

B. FY 81

(1) FMSCR \$21.0 MIL.

THESE FUNDS WOULD BE EXPENDED AS A CONTINUATION OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM PURCHASES OUTLINED IN SUBPARAGRAPH A(1) ABOVE.

(2) IMET \$.450 MIL.

THESE FUNDS WOULD BE EXPENDED AS A CONTINUATION OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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TRAINING PROGRAM REFERRED TO IN SUBPARAGRAPH A(2) ABOVE.

C. FY 82

(1) FMSCR \$20.2 MIL.

THESE FUNDS WOULD BE EXPENDED AS A CONTINUATION OF THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM OUTLINED IN SUBPARAGRAPH A(1) ABOVE.

(2) IMET \$.450 MIL.

THESE FUNDS WOULD BE EXPENDED AS A CONTINUATION OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM REFERRED TO IN SUBPARAGRAPH A(2) ABOVE.

DREXLER

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: US CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, MILITARY SALES, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 jul 1978
Decapton Date: 01 jan 1960
Decapton Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978BOGOTA06992
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780308-0594
Format: TEL
From: BOGOTA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780711/aaaaajez.tel
Line Count: 595
Litigation Code IDs:
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Litigation History:
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Message ID: 1c7b566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 168320
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1860000
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Subject: MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, CO
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1c7b566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014